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Conventional wisdom attributed China’s rapid urbanization to targeted measures taken by the 
central state. This paper looks at the role of Chinese local states in China’s urban and industrial 
growth, not as an advocate of urbanization and industrialization per se, but as an entrepreneu-
rial manager that aims to maximize its revenues from urban physical and economic growth. It 
demonstrates how local states in China are motivated by the imperatives associated with fiscal 
and political institutions and enabled by housing and land use policies to promote the growth of 
real estate and manufacturing sectors. Specifically, the political appointment system links the 
political prospects of Chinese officials to the office achievements accomplished during their few 
year terms, while the fiscal system related the local financial strength to their efforts to  mobilize 
 revenue collection. It is under such circumstance that urban growth becomes the imperative 
 mission of Chinese local states.
The housing and urban land use reform from the late 1990s facilitated the rise of real estate 
and manufacturing as the dual engines of urban physical and economic growth. Housing reform 
 generates huge demand for residential units and land use reform enables municipalities to control 
the supply of urban land for both real estate development and manufacturing production. Statis-
tics compiled from Chinese official data show the municipal strategy to expedite urban economic 
and physical growth is to bid up the price of land for real estate development by limiting the land 
supply and improving the floor area ratio on one hand, and offer land to manufacturing investors 
at excessively low rates in exchange for their investment commitments on the other. Furthermore, 
a majority of the tremendous “land granting premium” collected from real estate developers is 
used for urban construction projects, which may not only drive the land price up further but also 
can produce a shaper city image and attract more inward investments. This study concludes with 
implications of this urban growth logic for sustainable urban development. 
Keywords: Local state, urban growth, industrial growth, land use.
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assets such as urban land that can be used to build the entre-
preneurial project (Fitzgerald, 2002; Hendrischke and Feng, 
1999). The jurisdiction duties of county-level or district-level 
governments are stipulated by the municipal government and 
they do not have great administrative or inancial latitudes as 
a result (Zhang and Wu, 2006). 
Methodologically, the main body of this paper is divided into 
three sections to deal with the role of local states in China’s 
urban spatial and economic growth. It starts from local rev-
enue and expenditure structures to identify the general  action 
pattern of local states and then explores how they were shaped 
by China’s evolving iscal and political structures in an largely 
unintentional fashion. On the basis of qualitative evidence 
 collected from extensive interviews and quantitative oficial 
data, the third section uncovers the particular approaches 
taken by the local states during the course of China’s urban 
housing and land use reforms to promote growth in real estate 
and manufacturing sectors, which is the immediate driver of 
urban spatial and economic growth in China. This article i-
nally concludes with the impacts of this growth logic system 
and some policy implications. 
It should be pointed out that the fact that this article draws 
upon aggregate statistics published by Chinese statistical 
 authorities for quantitative analysis does not undermine the 
reliability of the data itself or the conclusions about local 
state actions based upon it. The reasons are two-fold. One is 
that many statistics cited in this paper are compiled as ratio-
based ones and others are used to observe the pattern on a 
time-series basis. Even to the extent that some numbers get 
tampered with by the government departments that reported 
them, it is very unlikely that the manipulation could happen on 
such a large scale or in such a sophisticated way that the ratios 
between them or the temporal pattern would be systematically 
distorted as well. Secondly, the aggregate data excludes those 
on the central level and is for the local level only. To the extent 
that the particular circumstance at each locale varies from 
place to place, the overall pattern as shaped by the uniform 
institutional scheme changes little across space, which is sup-
ported by the qualitative evidence collected at different cities.
2. LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
One concrete representation of the actions taken by Chi-
nese local states is the low of their inancial resources that 
demonstrates their entrepreneurial orientation to achieve 
 tangible urban economic and physical growth at the expense 
of social concerns. Originally a term associated with the mo-
tivation driving technological and organizational innovation 
as well as capitalist development at large, entrepreneur-
ialism is increasingly used in recent decades to represent 
the transformation of urban governance from traditional 
housekeeping type to a more proactive market-building one 
(Harvey, 1989; Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Yong and Kaczmarek, 
1999;  Jessop and Sum, 2000). The case of China, however, 
1. INTRODUCTION
As one of the greatest transformations humankind achieved 
in the past century, China’s remarkable urbanization and in-
dustrialization attracts the attention from communities of 
academia, government and business across the world. The 
 indicator of urbanization as measured by the proportion of 
population living in urban areas increased from 10.6 per-
cent in 1950 to 45.7 percent in 2008 at an average annual 
rate of 0.6 percent. Further investigation inds that urban-
ization in  China demonstrated an accelerating growth rate 
 after 1979 and  became even faster since 2000 with an annual 
rise of 1.19% (National Bureau of Statistics of China, various 
years). Along with the booming urban population is the rap-
idly  expanding urban space. Urban developed areas across 
China, for instance, increased from 9,386 square kilometers 
in 1985 to 36,295.3 square kilometers in 2008, at an annual 
rate of 6 percent over the 23-year period (National Bureau 
of  Statistics of China, various years). 
A vast volume of literature attributes China’s astonishing 
 urban physical and economic growth to the iscal and admin-
istrative decentralizations that gave rise to greater autonomy 
and stronger quest for development at the local level (Qian, 
2006). That argument, however, is increasingly inconsistent 
with the centralizing iscal and political structures as will be 
demonstrated in this article. Others taking the metaphorical 
perspective of corporate irms to understand this dynamics 
(Oi, 1992 and 1996; Walder, 1995; Duckett, 1998) may not be an 
accurate portrait of today’s Chinese local states because of the 
irrational government expenditures on public projects such as 
city halls, public squares, exhibition centers as well as state-
of-the-art stadiums regardless of social beneits and capi-
tal costs (Jin and Zou, 2003). Besides, those focusing on the 
 local iscal starvation and Chinese political features (Wu, Xu 
et al. 2007), however, did not address the speciic mechanism 
through which such conditions make local states entrepre-
neurial maximizers of economic and physical  performances 
within their jurisdictions, or how that objective is achieved by 
Chinese local states under the transitional institutions. 
Deviating from conventional wisdoms on Chinese urban 
growth, this article aims to illustrate its identiication, causes, 
processes and effects by demystifying Chinese local states 
as an entrepreneurial manager that aims to maximize tan-
gible urban physical and economic growth. Note that the term 
“ local” in China studies refers to provincial, municipal, county 
or intra-urban district scales that are all under the central 
state in a hierachical system (Chung, 1999; White, 1991). Al-
though the overarching institutional structure as will be illus-
trated in this article mobilizes local states actions at all levels, 
municipal governments have the most substantial space and 
substantive power to spur such growth and will be the focus of 
analysis of local states through this paper. In contrast, provin-
cial governments are subject to immediate supervision of the 
center and are largely devoid of direct control over tangible 
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still largely conditioned by the changing economic institutions 
as well as the national legacy of the political  system. Thus it 
would be a simplistic understanding of localities as a com-
plete retreat of state power from economic and social life. 
Rather, they are emerging as entities using a combination 
of state power and market instruments to achieve speciic 
 objectives. This section will discuss the institutional founda-
tion for Chinese entrepreneurial local states in terms of iscal 
and political structures.
3.1 SHIFT OF FISCAL INSTITUTIONS
In the absence of a uniform iscal system where the central and 
local states have clearly deined tax revenues and  expenditure 
 deserves  particular attention as it involves basic features 
 distinguishing the Chinese local state, in many aspects a 
 market actor that aims to maximize short-term achieve-
ments, from those in many other countries that orchestrate 
various market players into a project of structural competi-
tiveness building. By analyzing the major sources of  local 
revenue and principal items of expenditure, this section will 
present a systematic picture of the inancial dynamics of 
 Chinese local governments and their underlying orientations. 
Business tax, value-added tax (VAT) and enterprise income tax 
(EIT) are the three largest sources of Chinese local tax rev-
enues. Largely collected from manufacturing and real estate 
sectors, these three types of tax jointly registered 70 percent 
of total local tax revenues between 2000 and 2005. For busi-
ness tax revenues, the share of real estate and its associated 
construction sectors had been increasing constantly since 2000 
and reached nearly 50 percent in 2005. Meanwhile, the share of 
the inancial sector, whose strength is deemed as the core of 
competitiveness in the modern economy, continuously declined 
during the same period (State Administration of  Taxation, vari-
ous years). Manufacturing dominated the  sectoral distribution 
for both VAT and EIT with more than half of the former and a 
quarter of the latter coming from that broad sector (see Fig-
ure 1). Given the overwhelming shares of business tax, VAT and 
EIT in local budgetary revenues, it suggests many local govern-
ments are heavily dependent on investments in manufacturing 
and real estate for local budgetary revenues.
In addition to their dependence on manufacturing and real 
 estate for revenues, Chinese local states are also character-
ized by the deviation of their expenditures from ields related 
to civic life such as education, medical care and social secu-
rity. Figure 2 lists the growth rates of local inal expenditures 
for the largest ive items from 2000 through to 2005. Most 
items demonstrated generally accelerating growth rates over 
the six years, except 2002 and 2003 when a national austerity 
program was implemented. Noteworthy is their inconsistent 
growth rates in the post-austerity years of 2004 and 2005. The 
expenditures on both capital construction (item A) and urban 
maintenance (item C) quickly bounced up at rates higher than 
the average, while the spending on science and technology 
(item B), that on culture, education, science and health care 
(item D) and that on social security (item E) regained some 
momentum too, but at paces substantially slower than those 
of construction-related items. This indicates the motivation of 
local governments to launch constructions at the expense of 
public service provisions.
3. INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
The rise of Chinese local state entrepreneurialism as repre-
sented above is an outcome of broad and profound changes in 
the socio-economic system on multiple scales. In spite of the 
administrative decentralization resulting from the globaliza-
tion of capital markets, the exercise of that localized power is 
Figure 1: Sectoral Sources of VAT, 2000-2005 (in billion yuan)
Note: Due to limited data availability, only national total revenues 
are presented here. The lack of statistics on local budgetary 
 revenues, however, does not affect the basic assertion that locali-
ties largely depend on manufacturing as their main source of VAT. 
The reason is that the total tax revenues will be shared between 
the central and local governments according to ixed rates. Thus 
the sectoral distribution of local tax revenues simply follows the 
same pattern as the presented national igures.
Source: Compiled from Tax Yearbook of China [zhongguo shuiwu 
nianjian], various years
Figure 2: The growth rates of budgetary expenditures for major 
local account items, 2000-2005
Note: The expenditure categories of A through G are (A) =  capital 
construction; (B) = Innovation Funds & Science and Technology 
Funds; (C) = Urban Maintenance and Construction Expenditure; 
(D) = Operating Expenses for Culture, Education, Science & Health 
Care; (E) = Social Security Subsidiary Expenses.
Source: Compiled from Finance Yearbook of China [zhongguo 
caizheng nianjian], various years
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initially met with resistance from many localities, especially 
those wealthier ones that beneited most from previous iscal 
schemes. The center then recognized the vested interests of 
local governments by guaranteeing that each locality retained 
no less than what it had in 1993. In addition, 30 percent of the 
incremental central revenue collected from VAT and consump-
tion tax would be returned to the local governments as incen-
tives for them to mobilize revenue collection. In 2002, a similar 
scheme was instituted that localities would receive income tax 
and EIT no less than what they had in 2001 and a proportion 
of the incremental revenues would be refunded by the center.
The second category includes various special purpose sub-
sidies and grants. To compete for these resources, localities 
took measures called “paobu qianjin”, or “soliciting grants from 
central ministries oficials” who are in charge of their distri-
butions. This incurs considerable costs for local governments 
and largely counteracts the beneits associated with these 
well-intended grants. Besides, the “transitional transfers” (re-
named “general purpose transfers” in 2002) was designed to 
narrow the regional disparities in public service provision. This 
program, however, depends on incremental central revenue, 
which is quite limited by the dificulty in redistributing the exist-
ing revenues. The share of this program in the pool of all iscal 
transfers has therefore been less than 10 percent since 1994. 
responsibilities, volatility was characteristic of all pre-1994 
iscal systems in which a locality with better  inancial condi-
tions would have to deliver a higher share of its revenues to the 
supervising government in the next few years. This discour-
aged most localities from reporting its full  revenues by trans-
ferring part of the budgetary revenues into the extra-budgetary 
accounts, the consequence of which was the quickly declining 
 ratios of  iscal revenues to GDP and  central revenues to the total. 
A fundamental reform package called “tax assignment sys-
tem” (fen shui zhi) was introduced in 1994 to deal with the prob-
lems associated with previous iscal systems. The package 
included new tax items and division of revenues between the 
central and local governments. Additionally, a set of indepen-
dent tax collection agencies, namely the State Administration 
of Taxation (SAT), was established in all provinces and cities 
to ensure the collection of central revenues. More important-
ly, institutionalized measures were taken against the extra-
budgetary account. In September 1996, the State Council 
promulgated the Decision on Reinforcing the Management of 
Extra-budgetary Funds (guowuyuan guanyu jiaqiang yusuanwai 
zijin guanli de jueding) requiring the shift of 13 major govern-
mental funds from the extra-budgetary to the infra-budgetary 
account. As a result of these initiatives, the absolute size of 
local extra-budgetary funds shrank abruptly in 1997 (see the 
last column of Table 1). With a further campaign of “transfor-
mation of administrative fees into taxes”, the relative ratio of 
local extra-budgetary funds to budgetary revenues started to 
demonstrate a continuously declining trend. 
These efforts led to the reversal of the asymmetric inancial 
strength between the central and local governments with 
an increasing share of revenues lowing to the center while 
less was left to the localities. Both the absolute magnitude 
and the relative share of central revenues demonstrated 
sharp rises in 1994. In contrast to the clear division of tax rev-
enues between the central and local governments, however, 
the scope of expenditures was not explicitly speciied in the 
tax assignment system of 1994. Many duties of public ser-
vices were  simply delegated to local governments via politi-
cal imperatives  without corresponding sources of revenues. 
That was further aggravated in 1995 when many small and 
medium state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were released 
from the  ownership of local governments via merger, leas-
ing, contracting, offering for sale, or bankruptcy. In order to 
maintain good social  order, local  governments had to assume 
the responsibilities of continuing the services that SOEs used 
to provide to their  employees such as education, health care, 
and pensions, which resulted in a widening gap  between local 
budgetary  revenues and expenditures. 
The tax assignment system adopted various central-to-local 
iscal transfer programs to help local governments inance 
their expenditures. They can be divided into three broad cat-
egories (see Figure 3). The irst is the regular “tax refund”. As 
the “tax assignment system” would cut local revenues, it was 
Budgetary 
 Revenue/ 
GDP (%)
Central 
Revenue/ 
National (%)
Local Extra- 
Budgetary 
Funds 
(100 million 
yuan)
Local Extra- 
Budgetary 
Funds/Local 
Budgetary 
Revenue (%)
1993 12.6 22.0 1186.64 35.0
1994 10.8 55.7 1579.21 68.3
1995 10.3 52.2 2088.93 70.0
1996 10.4 49.4 2945.68 78.6
1997 11.0 48.9 2680.92 60.6
1998 11.7 49.5 2918.14 58.6
1999 12.8 51.1 3154.72 56.4
2000 13.5 52.2 3578.79 55.9
2001 14.9 52.4 3953.00 50.7
2002 15.7 55.0 4039.00 47.4
2003 16.0 54.6 4187.43 42.5
2004 16.5 54.9 4348.49 36.6
2005 17.3 52.3 5141.58 34.0
2006 18.4 52.8 — —
Table 1: National, Central Budgetary Revenues and Local Extra- 
Budgetary Funds, Since 1993
Source: Compiled from Finance Yearbook of China 2006 [zhongguo 
caizheng nianjian 2006]
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 dominant national ideology, a crucial turnaround in personnel 
management has involved the wholesale change in the eva-
luation criteria for government oficials. 
Although “economic development” consists of the  quantitative 
and qualitative aspects of economic dynamics, the  asymmetric 
information between different levels of governments makes it 
extremely costly, if not impossible, for the higher-level gov-
ernments to be informed of the qualitative characteristics of 
local economies such as environmental sustainability, eco-
nomic equality and social justice. The more easily available 
information on local economic performance is the quantitative 
magnitude of the economic base that is not only measured by 
the indicators of local GDP, the iscal revenues and FDI in-
lows (Li and Zhou, 2005) but also can be sensed from the 
tangible urban physical development like modern infrastruc-
ture,  mega-projects for art and sports and high-rise buildings 
(Wu, Xu et al., 2007). Thus, a rapidly growing local economy 
as represented by striking economic indicators and concrete 
projects becomes important political incentives or career 
concerns on the part of Chinese local oficials (Blanchard 
and Shleifer, 2001) who unanimously engage themselves in 
the competition for economic performance within their own 
jurisdictions as well as for the associated personal political 
promotion (Qian and Xu, 1993; Qian and Weingast, 1996).
As an important representation of oficials’ competence 
and performance, inancing large-scale urban construction 
is well beyond the capacity of regular tax revenues. For in-
stance, the total local budgetary revenues including central 
transfers were 2191.6 billion yuan in 2004 and the budgetary 
expenditures excluding capital construction and urban main-
tenance were 1753.1 billion yuan, which means only a portion 
of 438.5 billion yuan could be used for urban construction proj-
ects as the rest had to be spent in the rural. The total urban 
construction cost in that year, however, reached 525.8 billion 
yuan. That means urban construction in China is inanced by 
other important market-based instruments. Table 2 presents 
the inancial sources of urban construction in China between 
2001 and 2004. Bank loans, local budgetary revenues and land 
granting premium were the three largest inancial sources 
underpinning unprecedented urban physical renewal. Local 
tax revenues and bank loans provide pivotal support to urban 
physical construction that is publicly owned and used. What 
remains intriguing, however, is the nature of land granting 
premium. Starting with a brief review of the urban land and 
housing reforms, the following section will reveal the nature 
of this fund and show the critical role it plays in shaping urban 
spatial development as well as driving industrial growth.
4. STR✔TEGIES TO PROMOTE URB✔N GROWTH
The enormous land granting premium is a product of urban 
land use reform that commodiies land use rights (LURs) at 
bidding prices. Before it actually happens, however, there 
must be suficient market demand for land use to support the 
The immediate consequence of this overall transfer scheme 
is that business tax, VAT and EIT become the three most 
important revenue sources for Chinese local governments 
in the face of increasingly expanding expenditures. Firstly, 
business tax is not to be shared with the center and can be 
 entirely  retained by local governments. Secondly, the growth 
in tax  refund is closely related to a locality’s efforts in mobi-
lizing collection of VAT and EIT and is a more reliable source 
of revenue for local governments than those speciic purpose 
grants. Given that the amount of tax refund is determined on 
the basis of the incremental tax contribution, a  locality can 
only receive the same refund in the second year if its reve-
nues of VAT and EIT do not increase over time. It is exactly 
under this circumstance that local governments start their 
proactive search for investments and eventually  embrace 
 entrepreneurial industrial growth and urban expansion. 
3.2 PERFORM✕N✖E-B✕✗ED PO✚✘✙✘✖✕✚ SYSTEM
In contrast to the progress China has made in the realm of 
economic reform, its political institutions are characterized by 
a centralized system of personnel control that has remained 
largely intact even to this day (World Bank, 2002; Xu, 2004 
and Tao et al, 2004). Under such a top-down hierarchical sys-
tem, government oficials who are appointed from above but 
not elected by their respective constituencies have tended to 
be more responsive to higher-level government mandates 
than they are to local needs. Political centralization does not 
mean that there has been no change at all in the political 
arena.  China’s reform of its bureaucrat appointment system 
coincided with the beginning of its economic reforms. With 
class struggle supplanted by economic development as the 
Figure 3: Central-to-local transfers in China, 2003-2004 (in 
 billion yuan)
Note: The transfer categories of A through H are (A) = tax refund; 
(B) = Subsidies for increasing wages of public employees; (C) = 
subsidies for abolishing rural taxes and charges; (D) = subsidies 
for minority regions; (E) = subsidies for continuing implementa-
tion of pre-1994 iscal schemes; (F) = earmarked transfers; (G) = 
other speciic purpose transfers; (H) = general purpose transfers. 
Source: Shah and Shen (2006)
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July 1998, one month after the fourth national housing reform 
conference, the “Circular on Further Deepening Urban  Housing 
Reform and Expediting Housing Construction” (Guanyu jinyibu 
shenhua chengzhen zhufang zhidu gaige jiakuai zhufang jianshe 
de tongzhi) was released by the State Council. For the irst 
time since 1978, this document explicitly regarded marketized 
housing provision as a “new economic growth engine”. One of 
the most critical changes it introduced was to terminate the 
material housing distribution as welfare that had been exist-
ing for decades. Instead, individual households are expected to 
inance their house purchase via savings, provident fund and 
housing mortgage, which instantly forced a majority of people 
who had not received decent housing through their work units 
to purchase commercial houses from the market. 
In the same year, the central bank promulgated the Manage-
ment Measures on Individual Housing Mortgages (geren  zhufang 
daikuan guanli banfa) to facilitate the provision of housing mort-
gage. As a result of these deregulation measures, nationwide 
balances of housing mortgages rocketed from 19 billion yuan 
(0.25 percent of all loan balances) in 1997, through 740 billion 
yuan (5.89 percent of all loan balances) in 2002 (Wang, 2006), 
to 1840 billion yuan (9.45 percent of all loan balances) at the 
end of 2005 (The People’s Bank of China, 2006). This, along with 
the provident savings, greatly improved the purchasing power 
of individual households. In 2006, the regular residential units 
sold in terms of square meters increased to four times that in 
2000 (see Table 3). Encouraged by the rapidly growing demand 
for housing, the number of real estate development irms dou-
bled from 27303 in 2000 to 58710 in 2006 with newly construct-
ed regular residential units rising from 179.2 to 559.7 million 
square meters across that six-year period. 
Market-based housing provision inherently requires a mar-
ketized land use system so that both the land and the houses 
built on it can be properly priced. Pushed by the housing reform 
starting from 1998, a strict measure against illegal land trans-
actions on the black market, widely known as “No. 11 Decree 
of Ministry of Land and Resources” (MLR), was promulgated in 
May 2002. Conventionally, developers with connections to gov-
ernment could usually acquire LURs at a non-public negoti-
ated price then transferred it to other users at a higher market 
rate to reap a huge proit. This critical “Regulation on Granting 
State-Owned Land Use Rights by Tender, Auction and Quota-
tion” (Zhaobiao paimai guapai churang guoyou tudi shiyongquan 
guiding) was expected to prevent such land speculation as it 
required the land for commerce, tourism, entertainment, and 
commodity housing uses to be granted through designated 
public processes. As a result, the national cases of negotiated 
granting increased from 99,632 in 2000, to 145,228 in 2001, 
and 203,866 in 2002 but abruptly dropped to 157,381 in 2003 
(MLR, various years). 
With all LURs for commercial/residential development to 
be  acquired only via marketized tender, auction or quota-
tion, the consequence of residential building boom was that 
prices. Housing reform initiated at the end of the 1990s played 
such a role of demand generator. 
4.1 GENERATING HOUSING DEMAND
Comprehensive reforms of urban housing and land use 
 started from 1998 but prior to this, most urban land uses were 
carried out via state allocation or under-the-table negotiation. 
The absence of market mechanism detached urban land use 
from price principle. Consequently, this system of free alloca-
tion by the state led to the ineficient land use pattern in urban 
areas. One example was that residential land was squeezed 
out in favor of industrial land in urban cores because indus-
trial  production was given the highest priority by the state. 
Like the pre-reform urban land system where most urban land 
had been owned by the state and distributed free of charge, 
about 60 percent of the urban housing had been provided by 
the state work units as part of the socialist welfare package 
with the rest developed by the local governments as public 
housing for workers in small-sized enterprises that were inel-
igible for state housing investments or could not afford to build 
by themselves (Wu, 1995). Under the housing system featured 
by a single investment source of state money and negligible 
return from rent, it was impossible for the  construction and 
maintenance costs to be recovered even with the allocation 
of free land. The provision of housing heavily burdened the 
socialist state and urban housing conditions had rarely been 
improved since 1978. 
Since both the land use and urban housing problems were as-
sociated with the centrally socialist planned economy, they 
were expected to be resolved through a market mechanism. In 
2001 2002 2003 2004
Central Fund 9.0 7.6 7.7 5.3
Local Taxes 59.5 70.9 90.5 111.2
Urban Fees 20.2 30.1 37.1 42.7
Land Granting Premium 16.7 28.3 50.7 110.0
Domestic Loans 74.2 94.0 136.9 148.0
Foreign Investments 5.6 6.9 7.7 8.7
Bonds 0.7 0.3 1.6 0.06
Stock Financing 0.1 0.7 0.03 0.3
Self-Raised Funds 41.0 60.1 77.0 90.0
Others 25.6 30.5 33.0 26.1
Total 252.6 315.6 427.6 525.8
Table 2: Financing urban construction, 2001-2004 (in billion yuan)
Source: Compiled from Urban Construction Yearbook of China [zhong-
guo chengshi jianshe nianjian], various years
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 parcels does not affect the municipal manipulation of land use 
to promote urban physical and economic growth, the discus-
sion hereafter on urban land use will focus on those supplied 
at the discretion of municipalities. 
One strategy to maximize land granting premium is control 
of urban land supply that would not only lead to more intense 
competition among developers and thus higher LURs price, 
but also force developers to increase the loor area ratio. 
Inversely, the subsequent sharper image of city height and 
urban modernization would further boost urban land prices. 
The process was further complicated by developers’ efforts to 
create a stock of land in the expectation of higher prices in 
the future, which curtailed the amount of land available for 
immediate development. In response to this situation, the 
central state has repeatedly issued regulations since 2005 
to increase the urban land supply and prevent overly delayed 
development. As the attention shifted to residential land and 
housing prices, land for commercial development, service 
and ofice use was still under the tight control of municipal 
 governments. The acreage of land granted for these purpos-
es decreased from 19,466 hectares in 2003 to 16,390 in 2005 
(MLR, various years) while the loor areas of those buildings 
kept increasing (see Table 3).
Meanwhile, land left idling or delayed development was 
largely tolerated by municipalities by reason of force majeure 
a  dominating share of publicly granted land was used for 
residential development. The percentage ratio of residential 
land among all granted land acreage rose from 47.7 per-
cent in 2003 to 62.4 percent in 2005 (MLR, various years), 
which  suggests a majority of the property development in 
the market was residential building that was followed by 
the  commerce/service. 
4.2 LAND-BASED URBAN GROWTH STRATEGY
4.2.1 CONTROLLING LAND SUPPLY  
AND ACQUIRING AGRICULTURAL LAND
It is regulated that the supply of urban land via public pro-
cesses of tender, auction or quotation be conducted by the de 
facto owner of municipalities on behalf of the de jure owner 
of the state and most land granting premium be retained by 
the municipalities. With the explosive demand for residential 
houses and land, property development not only became a in-
triguing sector for private developers to make proits, but also 
a critical driver for the entrepreneurial local states to expe-
dite the growth of cities both physically and economically. To 
the extent that some urban land is under the immediate con-
trol of agencies other than municipalities, such as the army, 
larg SOEs or universities, they can be used only for their own 
building projects upon approval and cannot be directly trans-
acted on the open market. Because the presence of these land 
Residence Ofice Commerce Others
Regular Luxurious Affordable
2000
S 12170 641 3760 437 1399 231
C 17919 1169 5313 899 3035 1248
2001
S 15040 878 4021 503 1696 274
C 23280 1457 5796 1073 4105 1683
2002
S 18457 1241 4004 539 2219 348
C 27162 2278 5280 1254 4926 1900
2003
S 24310 1450 4019 630 2833 475
C 36174 2349 5331 1467 6707 2680
2004
S 28235 2323 3262 693 3100 619
C 40716 2976 4257 1704 7791 2970
2005
S 43564 2818 3205 1096 4081 721
C 48837 2835 3513 1671 7675 3533
2006
S 48414 3672 3337 1231 4338 865
C 55966 4058 4379 2135 8473 4241
Table 3: The loor areas of sold and started buildings, 2000-2006 (in hectares)
Note: The irst sub-rows headed by “S” represent the loor areas of actually sold buildings while the second sub-rows headed by “C” refer to the 
loor areas of newly constructed buildings in that same year. 
Source: Compiled from China Statistical Yearbooks [zhongguo tongji nianjian], various years
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Since the acquisition of agricultural land could only be legiti-
mately conducted by municipal governments, the continuous 
decreasing acreage of arable land and the rapidly increas-
ing land prices clearly demonstrate the municipal inten-
tion to convert the potential value of land into tangible cash 
in their coffers. Analogous to the “enterprise proits” in the 
business world, municipalities are left only “net premium”, a 
portion of the gross land granting premium, with the rest to 
be spent on compensating the dislocated farmers (for agri-
cultural land), residents (for residential land) or workers of 
bankrupt SOEs (for industrial land) as well as on consolidating 
the  acquired land for sale in the market by “ive connections 
and one  leveling” (wutong yipping, or connecting roads, water, 
drainage, electricity, telecommunications and the leveling of 
sites). In the three consecutive years from 2003 to 2005, the 
share of “net premium” in gross land granting premium was 
33.2, 36.5 and 37.1 percent respectively (MLR, various years). 
In other words, approximately one third of the gross land pre-
mium was retained by the local states as “municipal proits”.
Recall that a signiicant share of capital for urban construc-
tion across Chinese cities came from land granting premium. 
In 2004, the land premium expenditure on urban construc-
tion was 110 billion yuan (see Table 2). The total land  granting 
premium available for use in a given year could be estimated 
by its net proceeds in the previous year. Consequently, two 
thirds of the collected net premium was spent on urban 
 construction because the net premium was 179.9 billion yuan 
in 2003. In other words, a majority of the land granting pre-
mium was used to inance urban construction in Chinese cit-
ies. It should also be pointed out that until very recently, land 
premium was independent of either budgetary revenue or 
extra-budgetary funds as to be listed as a separate category 
in municipal  accounts. Thus, real estate development not only 
led to the enormous land granting premiums it created, but 
also became one of the key local industries with considerable 
tax contribution.
4.2.2 NEGOTIATED LAND GRANTING  
FOR MANUFACTURING INVESTMENT
Despite the vast municipal revenues associated with urban 
property development, they alone are insuficient to meet 
the expenditure needs of local governments. Firstly, as 
shown in Table 1, the main contributor to local budgetary 
revenues is the manufacturing sector. Real estate is lagging 
behind the sector of wholesale and retail in shares until 
2005 when its tax remittance was still less than 40 percent 
of that of manufacturing. Secondly, a large proportion of lo-
cal expenditures is inanced through the central-to-local 
transfer whose magnitude largely depends on the growth 
of manufacturing. In 2005, for example, the local expendi-
tures reached 2,515 billion yuan while local revenues were 
only 1,488 billion yuan. As debt  inancing by localities is not 
allowed in China, the transfer of 1,123 billion yuan played a 
critical role in local public inance. As illustrated in  Figure 3, 
such as the dificulties associated with displacing original 
residents or preparing sites. As a result of the tremendous 
demand as well as controlled land supply, the national land 
price indices increased abruptly in 2002 when the No. 11 De-
cree was implemented (see Figure 4). According to oficial 
statistics, the average price of land purchased by develop-
ers was 576 yuan per square meter in 2003 and reached as 
much as 907 yuan in 2006. It should be noted that the prices of 
residential land (both regular and luxurious) increased more 
quickly than for ofice and commercial uses, which suggests 
the former was not only an outcome of rising urban land value 
in general but also a result of the interaction between huge 
demand and undersupplied residential land. 
As land became a valuable commodity and its supply was mo-
nopolized by the municipal governments, relentless acquisi-
tion of arable land with unjust compensation to the farmers 
occurred. The total area of arable land across the nation 
shrank from 129.21 million hectares in 1999 to 122.08 million 
hectares in 2005 as relected by a  declining share of acre-
age in all land categories from 13.59 to 12.84 percent (MLR, 
various years). Nearly half of all lost arable land was used 
for constructions or other higher-yield agricultural activi-
ties with the remainder either damaged by natural disasters 
or reclaimed for ecological restoration. As the majority of 
the rural population relies on the land to make a living, the 
loss of arable land posed a threat to the economic and so-
cial stability of Chinese society. In 2003, the MLR issued the 
“Circular on Taking Further Measures to Strictly Implement 
the Arable Land Protection Scheme” (Guanyu jinyibu caiqu 
cuoshi luoshi yange baohu gengdi zhidu de tongzhi) to address 
the  alternative uses of arable land. In 2006, the approved 
eleventh Five Year Plan for the Development of National 
 Economic and  Social Development (2006-2010) explicitly 
mandated the preservation of a total of 120 million hectares 
of arable land across the nation. 
Figure 4: National land price indices, 1997-2006
Note: The land price indices in 1997 are set to 100. 
Source: Compiled from China Statistical Yearbook [zhongguo 
tongji nianjian], various years
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 prices jumped from 923 to 1702 yuan per square meter and 
from 1615 to 2509 yuan per square meter respectively. 
Perhaps a more convincing piece of evidence for the involve-
ment of local states in pricing industrial land is the ratio of 
net land granting premium to gross land granting premium 
(named “net premium ratio” hereafter) as presented in 
 Figure 6. Remember not all gross premiums can be retained 
by municipalities as their proits. The difference between gross 
and net premiums is the government expenditures on com-
pensating the dislocated or affected people and on physically 
consolidating the land for future development. Thus, the net 
premium ratio generally relects the intensity of government 
investment in converting the land from its current condition 
into one that is ready for immediate sale and development. 
Higher net premium ratio means less expenditure on unit 
acreage of land controlling the type of or the revenue gained 
from that plot, and vice versa. Results show the net premium 
ratios of industrial land are systematically lower than those of 
residential and commercial land with 26.8, 31.2 and 31.3 per-
cent, 31.9, 36.8 and 38.5 percent and 41.7, 40 and 38.8 percent 
for the three categories respectively from 2003 to 2005. 
approximately 40 percent of these transfers are in the form 
of “tax refund” and how much a  locality would receive is de-
termined by the VAT and EIT it remits. As the primary base 
for these taxes, the manufacturing sector attracts local 
governments who are in the pursuit of greater “tax refund” 
to bridge the gap between revenues and expenditures. 
The indispensability of manufacturing is also associated with 
its qualitative features as opposed to those of real estate, the 
growth of which is largely driven by relatively more volatile 
demand and is more easily susceptible to speculative capital 
or stringent state regulations against excessive investment 
and an overheated economy. Perhaps a more realistic rea-
son for valuing manufacturing is its ability to create sustain-
able revenues. In contrast, because property tax is not levied 
in China, revenues associated with property development, 
whether tax or land granting premium, are one-off in nature 
and will have to cease once the development is complete and 
the property is sold. Land is a inite resource in the sense that 
they can be occupied legitimately for decades. The acquisition 
of agricultural land is also subject to the constraint of master 
plans that must be approved by the center. Thus, the rapidly 
growing property development means the land stock avail-
able for development is quickly decreasing and its aggregate 
value is shrinking. 
It is under such circumstances that localities attached great 
importance to the growth of manufacturing sector. As land 
is an input of most manufacturing activities, its pricing is 
often manipulated to attract manufacturing investments 
with a dominating majority of industrial LURs granted via 
negotiation. During the three years from 2003 to 2005, 
145,632 or 95 percent of all the 153,429 industry-purposed 
LURs granting cases were conducted through negotiation at 
prices substantially lower than the market level. Over the 
same period, the average negotiated price was 120.91 yuan 
per square  meter, only one third of the average market rate 
of 347.64 yuan per square meter (MLR, various years), which 
clearly indicates the hospitality of Chinese local states 
 toward prospective industrial investors.
The suppressed industrial land price can be also mirrored by 
its stability over time. It is certainly true that due to the much 
lower return rate of land investments for industry develop-
ment, industrial land is usually located on the urban fringe 
with  prices substantially lower than those of commercial/ 
residential uses land. In the context of increasing needs for 
urban land, augmenting prices are expected for both indus-
trial land and  commercial/residential land. The growth rates 
of land price for residential housing and commercial devel-
opment,  however, have been markedly higher than that for 
 industrial use. Urban land price survey at 35 major cities clear-
ly shows the divergence between the growth rate of industrial 
land price and that of commercial land. From 2000 to 2007, the 
industrial land price increased slightly from 444 to 507 yuan 
per square meter while the residential and  commercial land 
Figure 5: Average land prices in 35 major Chinese cities, 2000-2007
Source: Compiled from data on http://www.landvalue.com.cn
Figure 6: Net premium ratio for different land uses, 2003-2005
Source: Compiled from China Land and Resources Almanac 
[zhongguo guotu ziyuan nianjian], 2004-2006
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a generally shrinking pattern since 2001, which is a clear 
 indication of the disinterest of local governments in providing 
affordable housing. 
As the hunger for industrial investment largely originates from 
the pecuniary motivation of local states, they are much less 
concerned with the qualitative nature of prospective projects. 
More often than not, projects with greater intensity of invest-
ment and larger volume of output are preferred by localities 
to small but lexible irms that are deemed as the carrier of 
creative potentials. This exclusive interest with big industrial 
projects greatly disadvantages private economy that has re-
mained weak even after thirty years of economic liberation. 
More often than not, environmental impacts are also ignored 
as a result of this investment hunger, which contributes to 
the increasing tension between urbanization on one hand and 
ecological deterioration on the other. China’s trade imbalance 
is also aggravated by its unparalleled volume of industrial 
production. All these factors call for a new mode of urbaniza-
tion and industrialization on the future path of China’s rise.
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